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SUBJECT: UN MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND
CHAD CONSULTATIONS: TALKING POINTS

1. The UN Security Council is scheduled to hold consultations on the Secretary-General's report on the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad on July 28. USUN may draw on the points in paragraph 2, as appropriate.

2. Begin Points:

I would like to thank the Secretary-General for his report on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). Today I would like to make four points.

First, recognizing the difficulties of deploying to a region like Chad and CAR, we remain concerned by MINURCAT's inability to deploy properly trained and equipped troops in a timely manner. The currently deployed contingent of 46% is not enough to provide the level of security and assistance demanded by the harsh conditions and general insecurity in the region. Without a fully deployed and supported contingent, MINURCAT cannot provide the necessary level of security to the civilian population and humanitarians in the region. Given the fragile security conditions in Chad and the Central African Republic, a security gap of any duration must be avoided. We urge DPKO and DFS and all organizations assisting with the deployment to take immediate steps to expedite troop deployments, and ensure that those troops are adequately trained and equipped to perform the mission, mandate, including by establishing consistent supply lines and logistical support for the mission. In continuing support of the mission, the United States will continue to provide equip-and-train programs to deploying African contingents.

Second, while we are pleased that the activities of the UN-trained Chadian special police, the Integrated Security Detachment (DIS), have resulted in improved security in and around the camps, we continue to be concerned about serious deficiencies in the training, equipping, and professionalism of the DIS. As shown by recent attacks on the DIS, it is critical the DIS be fully prepared and equipped to provide professional security services and be capable of defending itself against attacks from often heavily-armed bandits. We believe the DIS would benefit from additional UN training on criminal investigations, weapons handling, and police conduct. Improved equipment and better living conditions for the DIS are also needed if it is to reach its full potential. We also question whether the DIS have adequate resources to prevent child recruitment by armed groups visiting those camps. We strongly encourage MINURCAT to begin regular engagement with the GOC to improve the operations and capabilities of the DIS. We would also like to know how the UN plans to continue financing the DIS and whether MINURCAT foresees, given the proper training, the DIS resuming humanitarian escort duties between the camps rather than MINURCAT doing this itself.

Third, we are deeply concerned about the growing violence in the Central African Republic (CAR) caused by inter-ethnic disputes, banditry, and lawlessness. Internal displacement around Birao has increased. Due to limited capacity, local and national security forces in CAR are unable to prevent

further

violence. MINURCAT must assess its ability to provide adequate security in northeastern CAR, and adjust its operations in order to maximize its capability to protect civilians and humanitarian actors in the area. At a minimum, MINURCAT should ensure that the troop contingent deployed to Birao remains at full strength at all times and that they conduct as many patrols as feasible.

Fourth, although the United States recognizes Chad,s right to maintain the security of its borders against attack, it is imperative the Government of Chad demonstrate a commitment to ending the proxy war with Sudan. The insecurity caused by the operations of armed groups in Chad and Sudan jeopardizes the peace and security in the entire region, and undermines efforts to attain peace in Darfur and provide humanitarian assistance to the enormous refugee and IDP population in eastern Chad. We welcome the GOC,s and Sudan,s stated intention of working to ease tensions between the two countries and urge their continued cooperation in implementing the Doha accord and previous agreements aimed at normalizing relations between the two countries. We strongly believe the GOC and Sudan must work together to improve relations, end all military and logistical support to armed groups operating within their respective countries, and to use their best efforts to bring all parties to the bargaining table.

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